Mocking the Wizards’ Bradley Beal Return Misses the Point
The Washington Wizards and Bradley Beal stumbled their way through one of the most predictably frustrating star-franchise relationships in recent NBA history. When it finally came to a merciful end on Father’s Day, the general reaction to Washington’s trade haul was a mix of incredulity, outrage, and amusement.
How and why could the Wizards get only Chris Paul, Landry Shamet, and zero first-round picks for a three-time All-Star who averaged 30.5 points per game in 2019-20 and 31.3 points in 2020-21? The answer, of course, is that Beal had—without hyperbole—one of the most destabilizing contracts in NBA history before the new collective bargaining agreement, and its many restrictions, was ratified. Overnight, Beal’s deal went from a singularly unappealing compromise to toxic sludge. He’s guaranteed $207.7 million through 2027, and also owns, notoriously, a no-trade clause.
Make fun of the Wizards all you want. The fact that new president Michael Winger was able to offload this contract without taking back any long-term salary or surrendering any of the Wizards’ own draft picks is worth a round of applause. Instead, the franchise gained pick swaps and second-round picks.
Even though Beal hasn’t made an All-Star team in two seasons—a span in which he’s missed 74 of 164 games—and is about to turn 30, most of this analysis is less an indictment of his skill set and more a reflection of how devastating maximum contracts doled out to non-superstars can be under a new economic system that features a second tax apron that essentially functions as a hard cap.
Beal is very good and, more importantly, better suited to complement other superstars than to exist as the nightly fulcrum of a great offense. Unlike so many high-volume scorers, he’s malleable: comfortable, dangerous, and willing to engage off the ball as often as he is as a primary decision-maker.
Beal can bend defenses with a lethal and layered dribble handoff game that creates natural openings for his teammates.
Last season, the Wizards generated 1.23 points per possession on Beal DHOs, which was 10th out of 98 players who ran at least 200 actions. His pass-and-chase game with Kristaps Porzingis was effective in the duo’s limited time together, too. Beal doesn’t stop moving after the first action is complete, which will make stopping the Suns particularly difficult if they don’t force things.
Leaving him open—as Phoenix’s opponents did to Paul and other role players during the playoffs—won’t ever be an option. In the past three seasons, Beal made 39.9 percent of his 3s that were uncontested or lightly contested, according to Second Spectrum.
Before we go any further, it’s impossible to understand this trade without a depressing retrospective. The target of ire should be Washington’s painfully irresolute approach to moving on from one of the best players in franchise history, not the decision that finally set both sides free.
The Wizards had multiple opportunities to trade Beal to prop up their future. The first and best one came in 2019, when he was 25 years old, coming off two straight All-Star appearances, and wrapping up back-to-back seasons in which he didn’t miss a single game.
Granted, this is not the type of player a smart organization cashes out on. But the circumstances were unique; this isn’t simply a case of hindsight being 20-20. That February, Beal’s backcourt mate, John Wall, tore his Achilles tendon at the dawn of a four-year, $170 million contract extension. Around the same time, Otto Porter Jr., Washington’s other max contract signee, was sent to Chicago for Jabari Parker, Bobby Portis, and a second-round pick.
Anyone could see that Washington was locked into something rudderless. It had just won 32 games, as a mediocre team going nowhere. But instead of breaking up, the Wizards and Beal skirted logical trade rumors and agreed to kick the can down the road with an awkward two-year, $72 million extension that solved nothing and ensured purgatory.
The following year they won 25 games. Then, after they managed to get off Wall’s albatross contract by forking over a first-round pick for 32-year-old Russell Westbrook, Beal made his first All-NBA team and averaged a career-high 31.3 points per game in 2020-21. The Wizards advanced through the play-in as an 8-seed before a swift first-round defeat against the Sixers.
This, again, would have been a good time to terminate a partnership that had no capacity to win at the highest level. It’s never a good idea to delay the inevitable, but that’s what both parties chose to do when, last summer, coming off a 35-win season, Beal accepted a five-year, $251 million contract. He had no All-Star teammates, no promising young teammates, and an exasperating owner who was fearful enough to give him a no-trade clause. (Anyone willing to do that can’t build a championship-caliber team. It’s disqualifying!)
The only other players in NBA history to have had a no-trade clause are: LeBron James, Kevin Garnett, Carmelo Anthony, Dirk Nowitzki, Kobe Bryant, Dwyane Wade, Tim Duncan, David Robinson, and John Stockton. These are all first-ballot Hall of Famers who can lay claim as a Top 75 all-time player. And then there’s Beal, who last won a playoff series in 2017, has made only one All-NBA team, and will not be inducted into the Basketball Hall of Fame. (Once upon a time, Steph Curry tried to get a no-trade clause from the Warriors. He was not successful.)
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Offering that perk was a catastrophe in the moment. To get off it now, with disregard for value, was wise—before it got more damaging under the new CBA in a league full of teams that wouldn’t even consider absorbing it for nothing.
Without that anvil hanging around its neck, Washington’s new front office can start from scratch, with a ton of cap space—perfect for absorbing unwanted salary—and all their own draft picks, including the no. 8 selection later this week. (They owe a top-12-protected first to the Knicks next year that is top-eight protected in 2026, but it’s safe to assume the Wizards won’t be good anytime before then.)
By design, Washington will be extremely bad next season. But it also, finally, has some direction and organization-wide focus. Trading Beal was less about what Washington could get back to kick-start a necessary rebuild and more about ripping the Band-Aid off an entire era and finally giving itself an opportunity to start all over.
When you haven’t shown any self-awareness in a decade, winning or losing a trade like this is almost beside the point. What matters is that the Wizards finally did it, four years after they should have. In a vacuum, the return was far from ideal. Nobody is arguing that it isn’t. In reality, though, given what it took for everyone involved to get here, it’s refreshing, a salve, and something like a miracle.
Source: The Ringer
