Mistakes Cost Ukraine Round One of the Counteroffensive: War Experts
Ukraine's opening move in the counteroffensive was unsuccessful, experts just back from a trip there assert.
Kyiv bet big on a strategy that didn't pan out.
Part of the problem is that it relied on newer, less experienced units that made mistakes at a critical moment.
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Facing tough Russian defenses, Ukraine really needed to throw its opening counteroffensive punch "as close to flawlessly as possible" to achieve a breakthrough, but things did not go according to plan, war experts who recently returned from the front lines said in a podcast interview.
"The first phase of this operation was not a success," Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute who just came back from a research trip to Ukraine where he and other experts engaged Ukrainian officials, officers, and service members, said in a War on the Rocks discussion of the counteroffensive.
That does not "mean that the offensive has failed," he said, adding important context to his assessment of the first round. "The offensive is still going on. Ukraine still has reserves that have not been committed, but the initial phase wasn't a success for a variety of reasons."
In particular, Ukraine bet on a two-fold strategy: create new combat brigades for the future counteroffensive while leaving the most experienced fighters in place to hold the line against Russia's winter offensive. It's only partially paid off.
Ukraine's seasoned troops thwarted Russia's offensive, but they did so without adequate opportunities to rest and refit.
That left the new brigades training on Western weapons to play a "decisive role" in the counteroffensive, but "their performance thus far has not lived up to the expectations," Lee said.
Ukraine stood up nine brigades equipped with NATO weaponry for the counteroffensive. These units were put together quickly and forced to learn new systems, adopt new tactics, and build unit cohesion in a very short amount of time while the Russians shifted into a largely defensive position they spent months fortifying.
The Russian lines are guarded by minefields, anti-tank barriers, and trenches, as well as artillery, aviation, and anti-tank guided missiles.
A military serviceman practices actions necessary during the offensive of mechanized tank units in order to maintain professional skills at one of the training grounds, Ukraine. Dmytro Smolienko / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images
When the new Ukrainian brigades began sending troops and equipment into combat at the start of the counteroffensive, they did so with a less coherent approach characterized by miscommunication, deficiencies with reconnaissance and targeting, and poor coordination that did not work out as well as hoped.
"We saw in the beginning, the first couple of days' offensives, some of the kind of issues that the new brigades had," Lee said, noting that the mistakes were ones "that more experienced brigades likely would not have made."
In the early days of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, some of the advancing assault units were disoriented, especially at night, moved in the wrong direction, and sometimes ran into minefields that hadn't yet been cleared out, he said.
In one case, the advance was delayed and happened at dawn, instead of at night, limiting the value of the night-vision equipment in the new vehicles, equipment the Russians don't have for the most part. And the accompanying artillery barrage happened hours before the advance.
The latter error meant "all these Russian [anti-tank guided missile] teams and the infantry forces were not being suppressed when the actual advance occurred," Lee said. Artillery is often used to try to create chaos among defenders and force them to take cover right as armor and infantry troops advance.
Lee pointed out that while mines, which have received a lot of discussion, played a role in blunting the assault, the initial advances were primarily beaten back by Russian artillery and attack helicopters equipped with anti-tank missiles.
"They often didn't have a plan B or weren't able to seamless execute a plan B after they ran into kind of some of these foreseeable problems," Lee said, noting that the more experienced brigades that held the line during Russia's failed winter offensive would have likely been more prepared.
"They had surprise initially when they made these mistakes," which are not "shocking mistakes," he said.
An exercise held to maintain professional skills of the military personnel during the offensive of mechanized tank units takes place at one of the training grounds, Ukraine. Dmytro Smolienko / Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images
"In many cases, the time was very critical and really costly because then Russia could respond," Lee said, noting that the Russians "kind of learned where the main act, advance would be, and they could adjust their defenses accordingly."
Michael Kofman, a leading Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analyses who was part of the recent trip to Ukraine and who joined Lee in the War on the Rocks podcast, agreed.
He said that while Ukraine has performed well on defense, particularly defense in depth, throughout Russia's war, on offense, "the military is not as well organized and not as experienced at scaling offensive operations."
Franz-Stefan Gady, a modern war expert at the Center for New American Security who also just returned from Ukraine, argued in a series of social media posts summarizing his findings that one of Ukraine's biggest problems as it attempts to execute its counteroffensive is the inability to conduct effective combined arms operations at scale.
Ukraine has complained about minefields and lack of equipment, but this issue is key, he contended. And that assessment is supported by Lee's account of Ukrainian assault forces advancing against Russian defenses without suppressing artillery fire.
Combined arms operations are essentially about mixing combat capabilities to turn a box of a hammers into a single sledgehammer. It involves, for example, infantry assaults supported by mobile protected firepower and artillery, and if possible, aviation.
Combined arms warfare is not something most countries do effectively, and Ukraine lacks both equipment and experience with this kind of fighting. So while Ukraine is steadily advancing, it is, as the defense minister acknowledged, behind schedule.
The lack of necessary equipment and experience, along with the blunders Lee described, saw Ukraine miss its opportunity to strike a heavy blow, to break Russian lines and deliver a powerful first-round hit, but the battle continues.
Source: Business Insider
