Why Ukraine Had to Reboot Its Summer Offensive
The Ukrainian counteroffensive has finally begun, according to several news outlets. But, wait a minute—didn’t this get underway seven weeks ago, in early June? Well, some of these reports qualify, Ukraine is now mounting “the main thrust” of the offensive.
That, too, is a bit of an evasion.
A more accurate way of describing the latest phase of this war—now in its 18th month—is that the Ukrainians are rebooting their counteroffensive after their first attempt went rather badly. To put it simply, the Russian defense turned out to be more effective—and the Ukrainian offense less effective—than many had expected.
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This is the conclusion of several Western military analysts reporting from the front lines. (I should note, I am not in Ukraine, so must rely on their accounts as well as on news reports and emails with a few other observers.)
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For much of last spring, well aware of the coming offensive (which Kyiv’s officials were repeatedly announcing), the Russians intensively prepared for the assault. As the Economist recently reported, they laid mines, erected fortifications, and dug tank-trapping pits—not just on the front lines, but as far as 20 miles behind the lines, so that the Ukrainians couldn’t race ahead and capture much territory if they managed to punch a hole in some vulnerable spot of Russia’s defenses.
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As a result, the Ukrainians were halted in their tracks, bogged down by the multilayered defenses. The Russians also proved more adept than expected at shifting their defensive lines and at mobilizing attack helicopters and artillery fire to stave off attacks from wherever they might come.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainians sent in their newest recruits, some of them armed with NATO-supplied weapons, including the most modern U.S. and German tanks. The problem—as recounted by Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Rob Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute—was that these troops had little combat experience and no experience fighting as a unit. They’d also been rushed through training on the modern tanks and had trouble keeping them serviced and coordinating their movement with foot soldiers. They proved easier targets than perhaps even the Russians had anticipated.
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Kofman and Lee—two of the war’s most astute private analysts, who recently returned from their third trip to the front—said in a recent War on the Rocks podcast that Ukraine’s more experienced troops, even those armed with older weapons, have made the only real headway in recent fighting. The fresher but also greener troops, equipped with the newer gear, have performed “poorly.”
Kofman said it might have been better to put the more experienced troops at the forward edge of the assault, letting the newer troops provide reinforcement where needed, at least until they develop more cohesion as a unit and get a better grip on the nature of the fight.
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That may be what is happening now. Judging from this week’s initial (and therefore still somewhat foggy) reports on the offensive’s restart, the Ukrainians are moving forward in smaller groups of infantry fighters, probing possible holes in Russia’s defensive lines rather than trying to achieve rapid breakthroughs. (Some observers thought the Ukrainians were just probing in June; that is what they thought explained the slow pace. But Kofman and Lee discovered in their most recent trip that in fact the new troops were aiming for a quick and decisive breakthrough.)
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This redo of the offensive also seems to be concentrated in the south, where the Ukrainians hope to break through Russian defenses and plow all the way to the Sea of Azov, cutting Russian supply lines and dividing occupied territory into two zones, making it hard for Russians in one zone to reinforce those in the other.
Some analysts have complained about the West’s reluctance to supply Ukraine with jet fighters such as F-16s, but Kofman and a few other analysts with whom I’ve spoken don’t think more planes will provide much of an edge. The planes would be vulnerable to Russian air defenses (just as Russian planes are now vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses). And besides that, the Ukrainians are having a hard enough time coordinating their scattered ground combat units; it’s much harder still to coordinate air and ground units, and unless they do that, the effect of more air power would be nil.
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Kofman says Ukrainian troops told him they’re in greater need of more mundane supplies: night vision gear, spare parts, 3D printing equipment, and artillery shells.
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Ukraine has an edge in some measures, Russia has an edge in others, but on balance, it seems to be an even fight—which may be why the Ukrainians seem to be settling back into an attrition strategy, a slugfest in which they hope the Russians run out of arms, willing soldiers, patience, or political stamina first.
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In other words, the fight could go on, with no signs of impending victory on either side, for many more months.
Though no one is saying so explicitly, political developments may be feeding hopes on both sides. CIA director William Burns recently said in a public interview that the recent coup attempt by mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin exposed “signs of weakness” in Vladimir Putin’s regime, especially given the fact that Putin had to make a deal with his challenger—who used to be his chef—rather than simply bat him down. During Prigozhin’s 36-hour march on Moscow, Putin and his entire security apparatus seemed to be adrift. Burns said some in Moscow’s elite must be asking, “Does the emperor have no clothes?” Or at least, “Why is it taking so long for him to get dressed?” He went so far as to invite disgruntled Russian officers and officials to defect, or at least to become CIA informants.
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This disarray—if that’s what it is—hasn’t yet had a visible effect on Putin’s absolute control or on the performance of Russia’s army in Ukraine. But it might.
At the same time, President Volodymyr Zelensky is worried—as are many of his allies—that Western leaders and voters may grow impatient with the war if Ukraine doesn’t make much headway soon. This is especially true in the U.S., Ukraine’s main supplier, where many in Congress, as well as some leading Republican candidates in the 2024 presidential election, have expressed reluctance to keep sending Ukraine billions of dollars in military and economic aid.
For all the death, destruction, and mayhem—and despite the elaborate offensives, counteroffensives, defensives, and evolutions in tactics—the war remains, in some ways, what it has been almost from the beginning: a competition to see which side gives up first.
Source: Slate
